Objective:
According to the EU Military Vision and Strategy on Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations, cyberspace comprises the distinct but interrelated physical layer, logical layer and cognitive layer, which cannot be considered independently, but is one facet of the triad cyberspace, electromagnetic environment and cognitive environment. Pointing to the same direction, NATO’s doctrine for cyberspace operations described cyberspace in terms of three layers: physical, logical and cyber persona, where Cyberspace Operations (CO) always include the logical layer, but may also include activities or elements from the other two layers.
Military activities in cyberspace may comprise two overarching missions: to protect and defend their own cyberspace (national level, EU level, Coalition level, etc.) and conduct COs. In this context, Cyber Situational Awareness (CySA) describes the capability of perceiving, reasoning and projecting knowledge of the elements in the battlespace necessary to make well-informed decisions, putting emphasis on the cyber situations and their propagations to planned missions. Commanders need to acquire CySA at strategic, operational and tactical levels in order to make informed decisions on how to operate in cyberspace towards enhancing mission assurance and achieve cyber effects to support mission objectives. On the other hand, a holistic and human-understandable representation of the whole situation is needed.
Specific objective
Previous national and EU initiatives have addressed the conceptualisation and development of technologies for the acquisition of situational awareness by focusing on the logical sub-layer of cyberspace (software, services, networks, interfaces, etc.) but there is a raising demand of military-focused solutions able to holistically understand the cyberspace as a whole, taking into account all the layers.
The military operations in cyberspace possess complexity intrinsically linked to the challenge of understanding in real time the state of the different data processing planes in which its various actors coexist, as well as the relationship with the lines of effort, tasks and objectives of the missions they enable, where allies, enemies, unknown and neutral entities may coexist. These military operations extend the scope of the conventional understanding of situations in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) towards covering the understanding of the dependencies between the cyberspace and the COs context, the latter comprising Lines of Operation (LOOs) and their dependencies, Decisive Conditions (DCs) and how effects triggered by cyber situations may be derived on them, cyber Centres of Gravity (CoGs), missions in or through cyberspace, mission-enabling capabilities linked to cyber assets, etc., and impact/effect dimensions related with kinetic battle domain (air, land, space, sea) or hybrid propagations (information, political, economic, social, environmental, etc.). Developing mission-centric CySA capabilities able to assist human decision-makers while preserving the commander’s intent is considered a challenge, which is amplified by the difficulty of understanding the different sub-layers of cyberspace as a single environment and considering the hybrid effects consequent of cyber situations.
Scope:The proposals must focus on developing capabilities for mission-centric CySA, which as a System of Systems (SoS), must comprise independent enablers able to act jointly towards facilitating human decision-making through synergies between them. The proposals should address challenges in all the following areas:
Types of activities
The following table lists the types of activities which are eligible for this topic, and whether they are mandatory or optional (see Article 10(3) EDF Regulation):
Types of activities (art 10(3) EDF Regulation) | Eligible? | |
(a) | Activities that aim to create, underpin and improve knowledge, products and technologies, including disruptive technologies, which can achieve significant effects in the area of defence (generating knowledge) | No |
(b) | Activities that aim to increase interoperability and resilience, including secured production and exchange of data, to master critical defence technologies, to strengthen the security of supply or to enable the effective exploitation of results for defence products and technologies (integrating knowledge) | Yes(Optional) |
(c) | Studies, such as feasibility studies to explore the feasibility of new or upgraded products, technologies, processes, services and solutions | Yes(Mandatory) |
(d) | Design of a defence product, tangible or intangible component or technology as well as the definition of the technical specifications on which such a design has been developed, including any partial test for risk reduction in an industrial or representative environment | Yes(Mandatory) |
(e) | System prototyping of a defence product, tangible or intangible component or technology | Yes(Mandatory) |
(f) | Testing of a defence product, tangible or intangible component or technology | Yes(Optional) |
(g) | Qualification of a defence product, tangible or intangible component or technology | Yes(Optional) |
(h) | Certification of a defence product, tangible or intangible component or technology | Yes(Optional) |
(i) | Development of technologies or assets increasing efficiency across the life cycle of defence products and technologies | Yes(Optional) |
The proposals must cover at least the following tasks as part of the mandatory activities:
In addition, the proposals should cover the following tasks:
The proposals must also substantiate synergies and complementarity with activities described in the call topics EDIDP-CSAMN-SSS-2019 and EDF-2021-CYBER-R-CDAI, and in other relevant EU ongoing activities.
The proposals must give due consideration to design principles and implement a specific ethics-focused approach during the development, deployment and/or use of AI-based solutions, e.g. by the Assessment List for Trustworthy AI (ALTAI), in order to develop procedures to detect and assess the level of potential ethical risks and address them.
Moreover:
and
Functional requirements
The proposals must be supported by a set of capability requirements as agreed by a group of Member States or EDF associated countries (Norway). The proposals must give evidence of coherence between the proposed activities and the requirements by the Member States and EDF associated countries (Norway).
The proposals should aim to provide:
The outcome should contribute to: